I’ve spent half the year working in Nigeria for the last 12 years. Every time I come home I vow never to go back, but I always do. And not only for financial reasons, though I confess they are paramount. The fact is, I have a love-hate relationship with the place and its people, or rather its peoples.
As I see it, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and one of its largest economies, now stands at a complex crossroads of opportunity and crisis. From my standpoint, the Nigerian state represents a textbook example of a bloated, inefficient bureaucracy plagued by patronage, state overreach, and endemic graft. In addition, the persistent threat of militant Islamism in the country’s northeast, driven by insurgent groups like Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), poses a deep challenge to civil liberties, national cohesion, and regional stability.
As socio-economic pressures mount, Nigerians, especially professionals and the middle class and those at the bottom of society, continue to emigrate in large numbers, with the United Kingdom being a primary destination. In fact, a whole industry of legal specialists in Nigeria and UK has grown up around it.
From my small ‘c’ conservative perspective, the role of the Nigerian state is overwhelmingly expansive, often failing dismally in its primary obligations to protect life, property, and liberty, while intruding excessively in areas best left to private actors. Nigeria’s Constitution and laws, while democratically inclined on paper, enable state overreach, with over-centralization in Abuja resulting in a sclerotic administrative culture across its 36 states and 774 local government areas.
Corruption in Nigeria is not merely a flaw; it is systemic and structural. The anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International ranked Nigeria 145th out of 180 countries in its 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index, highlighting persistent public sector graft. Successive administrations have launched anti-corruption campaigns, most notably the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) but these efforts have often been politicised or neutered by elite capture.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially in the oil and gas sector (notably the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited, or NNPC), are riddled with inefficiency and graft. Most Nigerians view these SOEs as unaccountable monopolies that distort the market, drain public funds, and enrich politically connected elites.
Nigeria’s regulatory environment is another area of concern. Overregulation and contradictory laws make entrepreneurship cumbersome. According to the World Bank’s now-discontinued Doing Business Index, Nigeria consistently ranked poorly on indicators like starting a business, enforcing contracts, and getting electricity. Licensing requirements, customs duties, and opaque taxation continue to stifle innovation.
Critics argue that decentralisation and true fiscal and political federalism could foster competition among states and municipalities, encourage efficiency, and reduce corruption. Currently, most power remains at the federal level, despite constitutional provisions for “concurrent” responsibilities.
The rise of militant Islamism in northern Nigeria adds a darker dimension to the country’s political and security landscape. Groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP have inflicted tens of thousands of deaths, displaced millions (another driver of immigration to UK), and undermined both state legitimacy and human rights.
Boko Haram emerged in the early 2000s under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, with the ideology that Western-style education and secular governance were sinful. Following Yusuf’s death in police custody in 2009, the group radicalised further under Abubakar Shekau. ISWAP, a splinter faction aligned with the Islamic State, has since grown in strength, operating across northeastern Nigeria and into neighbouring countries like Chad and Niger.
These insurgents have consistently violently violated civil liberties: targeting schools, kidnapping children (as seen in the infamous Chibok abductions), and attacking civilians indiscriminately. This has effectively turned parts of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states into war zones.
The Nigerian state’s response to Islamic militancy often resulted in serious human rights abuses. The Nigerian military has been accused of extrajudicial killings, unlawful detentions, and indiscriminate aerial bombardments. These actions fuel grievances and recruitment for the insurgents.
Informed Nigerians criticise both the insurgents and the heavy-handed state response. They advocate for community-led counterterrorism, decentralisation of security, and investment in education and local economic development as more sustainable strategies.
In recent years, the Islamist insurgency has shown signs of expansion. Banditry in the northwest, especially in Zamfara and Katsina states, now overlaps with religious extremism. Attacks on Christian communities in the Middle Belt (e.g., Plateau and Benue states) raise concerns of ethno-religious cleansing.
Nigeria’s porous borders, weak policing, and lack of accountability make it fertile ground for the convergence of terrorism, organized crime, and smuggling networks. This directly impacts regional stability and increases the urgency of international cooperation.
Nigeria’s economic situation, despite its vast potential, remains precarious. The country is overly dependent on oil revenues, which are subject to price volatility and often syphoned off by corrupt officials. Inflation remains stubbornly high—above 30% in 2025—while unemployment and underemployment have led to a generational disillusionment.
“Japa,” a Yoruba slang meaning “to flee,” encapsulates the current mass emigration wave of Nigerian youth and professionals. Nigeria’s middle class, doctors, nurses, IT specialists, and legal professionals are leaving in droves, citing insecurity, poor governance, inflation, and lack of opportunity. The displaced and underclass, attracted by wildly exaggerated stories of UK government generosity, try to follow.
The UK is a top destination, driven by cultural ties, the English language, historic migration patterns and handouts. New UK visa categories, such as the Skilled Worker Visa, Health and Care Worker Visa, and Graduate Route, have opened doors for thousands of Nigerians. Between 2022 and 2024, Nigerians became the third-largest nationality granted UK visas, after Indians and Chinese.
This brain drain poses long-term challenges. While remittances (over $20 billion annually) support the Nigerian economy, the loss of skilled labour hampers healthcare, education, and productivity. Nigeria’s universities are chronically underfunded, and the country’s dependence on diaspora remittances creates a parasitic economic model reliant on external productivity. Thus, the mass emigration underscores the Nigerian state's failure. Rather than developing effective institutions or securing property rights, the state continues to prioritise political survival and elite rent-seeking.
Given the surge in outward migration, Nigeria has witnessed the rise of a growing cadre of immigration lawyers, consultants, and agencies who assist clients in navigating foreign immigration systems, particularly the UK’s. While immigration to the UK has become more streamlined through digital applications, UKVI (UK Visas and Immigration) rules remain complex. Immigration lawyers in Nigeria advertise help with student and dependent visa applications, skilled Worker and NHS-related migration (some even offer fake degrees and educational certificates and so on), human rights and asylum claims. appeal processes for rejected applicants, business and investor migration schemes. The newspapers and online is heavy with them.
Many firms operate in Lagos and Abuja, often in partnership with UK-based solicitors or law firms. Some also provide immigration litigation services, particularly for high-net-worth individuals or asylum-seekers fearing persecution (e.g., due to religious conflict or political dissent, real or imagined).
However, the sector is unregulated in practice, and this has allowed many unqualified or fraudulent "consultants" to exploit desperate migrants. Critics point out that overregulation of migration by foreign governments often creates black markets, just as underregulation at home fuels scam industries. There is a growing need for better legal protections, accreditation mechanisms, and public awareness. Or an end to mass immigration to UK.
The UK government, under successive administrations, has adjusted its migration policy to reduce net migration figures. Recently (2024–2025), the UK implemented tighter family reunification rules, higher salary thresholds, and reduced dependents rights. While these measures aim to curb overall immigration, demand from Nigeria remains high, particularly among healthcare workers, educators, and those fleeing insecurity. And they do nothing to stem the tide of illegal immigrants. The whole of Nigeria knows that if an illegal can get to UK, he’ll be set up for life. Many die trying.
Nigeria in 2025 represents a nation of paradoxes. It is rich in resources but poor in governance; vibrant in culture but stifled by corruption; democratic in form but autocratic in function. From a conservative, anti-corruption perspective, the Nigerian state's failure lies in its inability to shrink itself—to get out of the way of its citizens’ creativity, enterprise, and resilience.
Militant Islamism continues to menace the fabric of society, a symptom of bad governance, socio-economic deprivation and the nature of Islam. Without restoring state legitimacy, investing in security, and protecting civil liberties, this insurgency will not abate.
The resulting migration wave to the UK reflects a systemic failure. The rise of Nigerian immigration lawyers mirrors this shift, offering legal navigation amid increasing restrictions from the UK government.
Ultimately, reform must be structural and principled. Nigeria must decentralise power, privatize inefficient state enterprises, enforce the rule of law, and invest in human capital. Only then will the "Japa" generation return—and rebuild.